When a file is deleted, a DATA_DEATH leaf is committed to the transparency log containing the file ID, ciphertext hash (matching the birth certificate), deleter's fingerprint, timestamp, and revoked shares. The blob is permanently removed. The per-file encryption key's salt is deleted, making re-derivation impossible. The user receives a Merkle inclusion proof — independently verifiable by any third party, including regulators.

Every file access commits a FILE_ACCESS leaf with the accessor's fingerprint, access type, ciphertext hash, and timestamp. This is not a database entry the admin can edit — it is a leaf in a Merkle tree. Cloud admin consoles log access, but the provider controls the console and can modify the logs. Sovereign Drive's access log is independently verifiable — the same structure that secures Certificate Transparency for TLS.

Every share commits a FILE_SHARE leaf recording who shared what with whom, at what permission level, and when. ECDH key wrapping ensures sharing is not just logged but cryptographically bound to the recipient's verified identity — the recipient must prove key ownership to decrypt.

The server stores only ciphertext it cannot decrypt. It is structurally impossible to train on ciphertext — not a policy promise, a mathematical property. Combined with the tamper-evident access log, any unauthorized access attempt appears as an anomalous FILE_ACCESS leaf. Cloud providers publish policies saying they don't use customer data for AI training. This makes the guarantee structural.

Drive, Mail, and VPN Governance share the same Merkle tree. A single audit query traces: governance decision → email that communicated it → file containing the evidence → who accessed the file → when it was deleted. This cross-product provenance chain does not exist anywhere else.